Abstract. B. Wang and Y. Hu (Computers and Mathematics with Applications, Volume 59, Issue 1, 2010) proposed a knapsack-type publickey cryptosystem by introducing an easy quadratic compact knapsack problem and then using the Chinese remainder theorem to disguise the easy knapsack instant. In this paper, we present a heuristic stereotyped message attack that allows the cryptanalyst to recover the plaintext message when partial information about the original message is known. In particular, as shown by our experiments, for the proposed system parameter n = 100 which corresponds to a block length of 400 bits, exposing 60% of the plaintext allows the cryptanalyst to recover the remaining 160 bits of the message with a success probability of about 90% in about 2 hours.
Introduction
Knapsack-based cryptosystems [1] [2] were among the first public-key systems to be invented. Their seemingly NP-completeness nature and their high encryption/decryption speed made them very attractive. However, it was soon realized that the underlying knapsacks often have a low density [3] and hence they are vulnerable to lattice reduction attacks [4] [5] .
In [6] , B. Wang and Y. Hu proposed a knapsack-type public-key cryptosystem by introducing an easy quadratic compact knapsack problem and then using the Chinese remainder theorem to disguise the easy knapsack instant into a seemingly hard one. The authors showed that their cryptosystem achieves a high knapsack density [3] under the re-linearization attack model. Furthermore, by showing that the underlying compact knapsack problem always has exponentially many solutions, they argued that it is computationally infeasible for the attacker to find all the solutions among which the attacker expects to pick out the plaintext. They also provided some analysis that shows that the proposed cryptosystem is secure against brute-force attacks and some known key-recovery attacks including simultaneous Diophantine approximation attacks and orthogonal lattice attacks [7] .
In this paper, we present a heuristic attack against this system. Our attack allows the cryptanalyst to recover the plaintext message if part of it is exposed.
Practically, this attack is applicable for situations where the encrypted messages have a specific structure (also referred to as stereotyped messages [8] [9] [10] ).
For example, the plaintext message that sends a daily session key may have the form "The secret for August 14, 2010 is * * * * " where the actual secret is unknown. Similarly, a message that sends an account registration confirmation may have the form "Your login name is * * * * and your password is * * * * ".
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief review of the relevant properties of the quadratic compact knapsack scheme is given in the next section.
Our attack is described in section 3 and the computational experimental results that confirm its effectiveness are presented in section 4.
Description of the quadratic compact knapsack Scheme
In this section, we briefly review the features of the quadratic compact knapsack public key system that are relevant to our attack. Further details about the encryption and decryption operations as well as the key setup can be found in [6] .
The plaintext message is encoded such that M = (m 1 , · · · , m n ) and m i ∈ {0, 1, · · · 15} is encoded in 4 bits. Then the ciphertext is calculated as
where
tr is the system public key generated by the key generation algorithm and tr denotes the transpose operation. For the purpose of our cryptanalysis, the details of the key generation algorithm are irrelevant and we only need to note that, given the system parameters' specification in [6] 
However, in [6] , it was shown that the density of the above system is given by
which is, for practical values of n, high enough to prevent low density attacks.
Furthermore, this class of attacks is very unlikely to succeed in finding the original message M because many other vectors in the corresponding attack lattice are shorter than M [6] .
The suggested security parameter for this system (n = 100) corresponds to a public-key size of about 6157 bits, and knapsack density of about 1.27 which is sufficiently high to prevent low density attacks. Furthermore, according to the analysis presented in [6] , because of the non injectivity property of the system, the low-density subset-sum attack can find the valid plaintext only with probability ≈ Given an integer lattice basis as input, the goal of the lattice basis reduction algorithm is, to find a basis with short, nearly orthogonal vectors. Although determining the shortest basis is possibly an NP-complete problem, algorithms such as the LLL algorithm [5] can find a short basis in polynomial time with guaranteed worst-case performance. The reader is referred to [4] , [13] for basic background of lattices in Z m and various applications of lattice reduction in cryptography. Throughout the rest of this section, we describe the details of our proposed attack.
While there exists no efficient algorithm for solving a general quadratic Diophantine equations [11] , [12] , the specific constraints imposed on the solution space, i.e., the fact that m i ∈ {0, 1, · · · 15}, allows us to develop a heuristic algorithm to recover the plaintext message if part of M,
is known.
It should be noted that for the traditional knapsack systems, partial exposure of the message can be utilized, almost in a trivial way, to reduce the dimensions of the lattice used in attacking these systems. However, for the quadratic knapsack system under consideration, utilizing the knowledge of M to directly attack a smaller instance of the knapsack in the form of Eq. (1) using the traditional lattice reduction based attack (where the unknown vector would be of length n−l instead of n) does not allow us to recover the remaining unknown coordinates of M since, as explained in [6] , the unknown vector is very likely to be larger than the basis of the reduced lattice. Our proposed attack proceeds in the following steps:
1. Formulate an initial basis B as follows
where I denotes the identity matrix, and c denotes the ciphertext corresponding to the partially exposed message. Choosing the constant d 1 large enough [13] ensures that the reduced (row) basis corresponding to B will be in the formB 
where s is a relatively short integer vector. Given M, one can recover s by solving a set of linear equations. However, since only partial information about M is assumed to be known to the attacker, the number of possible solutions that one has to examine in order to find s is expected to be exponentially large. In order to overcome this problem, we use the lattice reduction algorithm one more time to find s.
Let
denote the exposed l components of M (which are not necessarily contiguous) and let A be the n × l matrix constructed from the l columns of A corresponding to the known coefficients in M, i.e.,
Form the basis
). Again, the proper choice of the constant d 2 [13] ensures that the reduced basis corresponding to B will be in the form
where Π is a permutation matrix. The 0 (n+1−l)×l on the top right corner of C grantees that the first l columns of each row of S × A is equal to Y or an integer multiple of it. The above steps are illustrated using the same example that the authors in [6] gave to support their argument about the security of their proposed system. 
For d 1 = 100000, the reduced basis matrix corresponding to B is given by 
Without loss of generality, assume that the first four coordinates of M are known to the attacker. Then, with d 2 = 10000, we form the basis 
Computational Experiments
The structure of the basis C used in the second step of the attack implies that the attack fails only in situations corresponding to the cases where there are at least (n + 1 − l) vectors in the form
whose first l coordinates are given by Y or an integer multiple of it and v i is shorter than s. Consequently, the vector s will not show in the reduced basisĈ.
Because of the heuristic nature of the lattice reduction algorithm, determining an analytical expression for the probability of this event, and consequently the failure probability of our attack, seems to be an intractable problem. However, it is intuitively expected that increasing l should improve the probability of success (i.e., as l → n, prob(success) → 1) since the existence probability of such short vectors, w i , i = 1, · · · , n + 1 − l, with such constraints on its first l coordinates should diminish as l increases.
In this section, we provide some experimental results that confirm the effectiveness of our proposed attack. The performance of our attack was evaluated using Maple version 10 on a lenovo X61 laptop running Intel Core Duo CPU@1.6
GHz with 2 GB of memory.
For small values of n ≤ 50, our attack succeeds with a good probability even if the exposed portion of the message, l, is less than n/2. On the other hand, for practical large values of n, the attack succeeds with non negligible probability only when l exceeds n/2. In particular, assuming that 60% of the original plaintext is pre-exposed to the cryptanalyst, for n = 80, our attack always succeeded in recovering the remaining (0.4 × 4 × 80 = 128) message bits in about 86 minutes on average. For the suggested suggested security parameter, n = 100, our attack succeeded in recovering the remaining 4 × 40 = 160 bits of the message for 9 out of 10 cases in about 121 minutes on average.
Conclusions
The security level of the quadratic compact knapsack public key cryptosystem proposed by Wang and Hu is overestimated. In particular, for the suggested value of the system parameters, our stereotyped message attack allows the cryptanalyst to efficiently recover the unknown part of the plaintext with high success probability if about 60% of the original message was known to the attacker.
